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Self or other: Directors’ attitudes towards policy initiatives for external 
board evaluation 
Abstract: Recurrent crises in corporate governance have board practice and created policy 
pressure to assess the effectiveness of boards. Since the 1990s boards have faced calls to 
undertake regular, formal evaluation. Since 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code has 
urged large corporations to engage outside parties to conduct them at least every three years, 
a move that other jurisdictions have copied. Despite this policy importance, little research has 
been conducted into processes or outcomes of board evaluation. This study explores the 
attitudes of directors on evaluation, whether self-administered or facilitated by others. We find 
acceptance of the principle but reservations about the value and even honesty in questionnaire-
based approaches. We find scepticism about, but also acknowledgement of, the benefits of 
using outside facilitators, especially for their objectivity and because their interviewing elicits 
insights into board dynamics. As this practice expands beyond listed companies to non-listed 
ones, charities, and even governance branches of government, our findings point to a need to 
professionalise outside facilitation.  
Keywords: Board evaluation, external facilitation, directors, corporate governance 
  
 Accepted for publication at International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (Palgrave); August 2020 
 2 
Introduction 
When the British company Carillion collapsed in early 2018, there was nothing to save. A 
major government outsourcing firm, it was simply liquidated, not even allowed the slim 
chance of survival permitted under the bankruptcy form called “administration”. Months 
earlier, its final annual report boasted complete compliance with the UK corporate governance 
code. Moreover, it declared that its latest board evaluation, conducted by a leading firm of 
specialist facilitators, had determined its board to be “highly effective” and “further improved” 
(Booth & Nordberg, 2018).  
 Crises in corporate governance seem to know no end, despite decades of policy initiatives 
and changes in corporate practice. In the UK, lessons from multiple corporate collapses in the 
early 1990s set a new direction in code-based best practice (Cadbury, 1992), but it proved not 
to be an elixir (Nordberg & McNulty, 2013). Policy in many countries now pushes 
corporations to conduct regular and systematic reviews of the performance of their boards of 
directors. Many companies have complied: some boards conduct self- and peer-evaluation; at 
others, the chair conduct appraisal of fellow directors and the board as a whole. Following the 
global financial crisis, the emphasis has swung towards using external facilitators for 
impartiality and expertise. Even so, corporate malfeasance has not been vanquished, as the 
failure of Carillion, exemplifies (UK Parliament, 2018). 
The idea of board evaluation has a long and wide pedigree. The Toronto Stock Exchange 
recommended evaluations as far back as 1994 (Cadbury, 1999). The New York Stock 
Exchange requires annual, internal board and committee evaluations (NYSE, 2014). 
Professional advisory firms in a variety of countries recommend it (e.g., in India; see Deloitte, 
2014). Board evaluation became policy in the UK with publication of the version of the 
Combined Code (FRC, 2003) that followed the Higgs Review (2003). Initially the code urged 
annual evaluations in some form, and later (FRC, 2010) came a recommendation that external 
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facilitators lead the process at least every three years, rather than relying only on internally 
conducted evaluations.  
Despite this interest from practitioners and policymakers, empirical research in board 
evaluation is still quite limited (Nordberg & Booth, 2019a). The sensitivity of the subject 
matter, combined with much discussed problems of penetrating the “black box” of corporate 
boards (Zona & Zattoni, 2007), means that access is difficult. This paper makes a start by 
exploring attitudes of directors who have undergone the process. Even though their companies 
fall below the threshold specified in policy, all have been involved in board self-evaluations 
and several had experience with evaluations using professional facilitators. 
Our contributions are two-fold: First, this study shows acceptance, sometimes grudging, 
that external evaluation of boards can add value when they focus on interpersonal dynamics 
that questionnaire-based evaluations overlooks. This validates the policy direction in codes 
and listing rules to mandate at least occasional use of external facilitators in larger firms. 
Second, acknowledgement of that value, even among companies not bound by such 
institutional or policy pressure, also points to a need for a professionalisation of service 
providers, and for research to better understand the overlaps, complementarities, and 
limitations of board self-evaluation and exercises facilitated by outsiders. 
The balance of the paper is organised as follows. To set the scene, we sketch the market 
and institutional context in which calls for board evaluation became so strong. We then review 
the modest but growing literature on board evaluation, differentiating between normative, 
conceptual, and empirical studies. After a discussion of the sample and the method of data 
analysis, we report on interviews with 17 people holding director roles at 50 listed companies 
operating under British law and regulation. We then discuss the implications of their views for 
the process of evaluation, identifying different functions the two types can serve and different 
processes they might follow, as well as avenues for further research. 
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Despite its small scale, this study also offers reasons to question some well-intended 
policy prescriptions in recent years and to build evidence for future policymaking. In so doing, 
it provides a basis for thinking that boards might use more extensively the discretion they have 
under the “comply-or-explain” provisions of codes like the UK Corporate Governance Code 
to experiment with other approaches.  
Market and institutional context 
Poor board performance has long been mooted as the source of corporate governance 
lapses. Agency theorists identified lax controls on senior management as contributing to both 
the rises in executive pay and the lack of concentration of shareholder value in the 1970s, 
especially in the US (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Ross, 1973). This theorising led to 
normative conclusions including stronger and more independent boards of directors and 
greater shareholder scrutiny (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Roe, 1994). Professional bodies, 
including the National Association of Corporate Directors in the US (NACD, 2001), and stock 
exchanges like Toronto recommended some form of board appraisal to safeguard against lazy 
directors (Cadbury, 1999; Leblanc, 2002). Nonetheless such urging met with considerable 
resistance among directors (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2002). 
The collapse of major corporations in the 2000–2003 period, particularly in the US, led to 
policy demands for action. In the UK, the government-sponsored Higgs Review (2003) 
recommended annual evaluations of the whole board, committees, and individual directors, 
adding that using outside facilitators “can bring objectivity” (2003, p. 50). As incorporated in 
a new version of the Combined Code (FRC, 2003), the recommendation became one of annual 
evaluations but the code itself did not mention external facilitation. A similar recommendation 
in the European Union followed (European Commission, 2005), which was echoed in a 
revision to the G20/OECD corporate governance principles (OECD, 2015). The UK 
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provisions are subject to a “comply-or-explain” regime. Uptake was initially rather tentative 
(Grant Thornton, 2009).  
That changed, however, after the financial crisis of 2007–2009, when one small UK bank 
was nationalised and two large banks part-nationalised. One, Royal Bank of Scotland, had 
transformed itself through aggressive acquisitions into the largest bank in the world (FSA, 
2011). Policy responded with a new UK Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010) that urged 
annual evaluations of the boards of the largest 350 companies (FTSE350) and externally-led 
ones at least once every three years. Acceptance grew steadily (cf. Grant Thornton, 2011, 
2016). 
The UK policy caught the spirit of the time, and authorities in many jurisdictions put 
pressure on corporate boards to undertake some form of self-assessment or use external 
consultants to examine board performance. Nicholson, Kiel, and Tunny (2012) found wide 
institutional support in Asia, Europe and North America for board evaluation, mainly through 
codes of corporate governance. At the time of their data collection, the UK was the only 
country that specifically recommended external facilitation; this has now grown to more than 
15 countries.  
But policy may differ from practice. A recent study by proxy voting agency Minerva 
Analytics (2019) of governance disclosures in Europe illustrates much corporate attention to 
evaluating boards, but only modest uptake of the policy direction towards external facilitation. 
Self-evaluations fare better, though with reservations. A survey by the accountancy firm 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC, 2014) found that 91% of directors felt their self-evaluation 
programmes were at least somewhat effective, but 70% said they had trouble being frank. 
Board evaluation theory and evidence 
The literature on board evaluation can be viewed as developing a variety of themes: the 
objectives of the exercise, the audiences addressed, the people and entities evaluated, the 
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process of evaluation, the content evaluated, and who conducts the evaluation. The objectives 
might be internal, aiming at board effectiveness, or external, seeking legitimacy. Audiences 
would differ accordingly. Evaluations might be comprehensive, concerning the board as a 
whole, board committees, and individual directors, or be undertaken only selectively. They 
can range in process across a spectrum from the formal and systematic to the very informal. 
The content evaluated can be categorised as including board processes (including the process 
of evaluation itself) and the interpersonal relationships between directors.  Importantly for our 
study, they can be conducted internally, often led by the chairman, or make use of external 
facilitation. A summary of the literature can be seen in Table 1. 
----------- Insert Table 1 about here ------------ 
The policy direction has roots in widespread appreciation of the value generated through 
employee appraisal, and some of the frameworks and checklists used in practice draw ideas 
from employee performance appraisals (Spencer Stuart, 2017). But directors are not 
employees; they are elites who work together only episodically (Forbes & Milliken, 1999) and 
are – in the ideal of best practice – selected for independence of mind rather than compliance. 
Board evaluation processes may therefore lose the confidence of the directors themselves if, 
like employee appraisals, they come to be seen as instruments of discipline by external 
audiences. Groothuis (2011) notes that directors are often wary that external facilitators may 
not understand the complexities of the issues that boards face. 
Early scholarly analysis came from Van der Walt and Ingley (2000), who sought to 
identify factors that contributed to the internal objective of board improvement as a step in 
building a model of board evaluation. Ingley and Van der Walt (2002) went on to identify the 
political aspects of board evaluation, including external reasons for why some boards 
undertook evaluations but also reasons for their resistance to evaluation processes. Among 
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their concerns was a fear the process would upset the cohesion and trust needed for the board 
to function well.  
Much of the literature is normative, often seeking to generalise from practice-led insights 
and discussing the tools and methods used. Summarising such articles, Minichilli, 
Gabrielsson, and Huse (2007) develop a schema for the evaluation process, including 
identifying four “building blocks” of a system, comprising: 1) what its content should be; 2) 
to whom it is addressed, that is, whether it is focused on internal improvements or had external 
audiences; 3) how the process unfolds in practical terms; and 4) who conducts the evaluation. 
This logical schema is helpful in suggesting ways practitioners can undertake the process, 
though it stops short of providing an evidence-base about the effectiveness of evaluation.  
In their study of board effectiveness in small firms, Machold, Huse, Minichilli, and 
Nordqvist (2011) suggest that evaluations can be powerful tools for board development. But 
that is an assertion, not a direct outcome of their empirical work. Kiel and Nicholson (2005) 
also provide a practice-focused guide to board evaluation and a framework for doing it.  
Concerning “who evaluates”, Long (2006) draws on her experience in the practice board 
evaluation with major corporations to highlight how an outside facilitator can overcome the 
lack of professional knowledge in evaluations led by chairmen. In a recent conceptual study, 
Nordberg and Booth (2019b) link efforts aimed a board improvement to the ability of 
evaluators to observe skills and knowledge in action within the black box of the board. They 
contend that external facilitators may be able to fill a gap in understanding that cannot be 
deduced from externally available evidence on board composition and governance disclosures. 
Nicholson et al. (2012, p. 288) note that a “major criticism of external reviews is that they 
rely on the published statements of companies”. While some companies commission reviews 
from corporate governance ratings firms as “external” sources, our experience of the practice 
in the UK and places that followed its lead is that most consider external facilitation involving 
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a consultant interviewing directors and observing meetings. Such interventions are costly but 
can elicit much sensitive, qualitative information.  
The literature also gives anecdotal evidence of directors’ scepticism about whether 
external facilitators have the insight necessary get behind the façades that directors and boards 
construct. In a provocative analysis, Wiersema and Zhang (2011) examine the disciplinary 
role that analyst interventions play in CEO dismissals to argue that investment analysts may 
be better evaluators than human resources specialists or board consultants.  
Direct empirical work to date is limited, however. While a handful of studies examine 
board evaluation in narrow contexts, including sustainability actions (Aly & Mansour, 2017), 
family business (Vandebeek, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, & Huybrechts, 2016), or assessment 
of board committees (Martinov-Bennie, Soh, & Tweedie, 2015), none documents benefits and 
drawbacks of internally guided and externally facilitated evaluations.  
In terms of outcomes, Dulewicz and Herbert (2008) undertook a survey involving 29 
company secretaries from among the FTSE350, finding that the process can lead to significant 
changes of board personnel. Evaluations contributed to the resignation of directors in nearly a 
third of cases, while gaps identified influenced appointments of new directors even more 
frequently (cited in Nicholson et al., 2012). 
In a multiple case study analysis, Rasmussen (2015) raises questions over whether board 
evaluation can measure the effectiveness. Her study shows evidence of the internal politics 
noted by Ingley and Van der Walt (2002) and Schaffer (2002) and calls attention to externally 
focused purposes of evaluation: While meant to enhance board accountability, evaluation can 
induce political behaviour.  
The literature is largely silent on the circumstances under which evaluations take place. 
The policy initiative in the UK seeks annual evaluations and externally facilitated ones at least 
every three years. But that would seem to lead to a schedule unrelated to the circumstances of 
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the company or decisions a board might face. Boards might schedule appraisals for quiet times, 
when challenge, heated debate, and the chance of dysfunctional behaviour are low. The 
literature also gives little insight about the conduct of evaluation – where it takes place, using 
what methods of data collection for which types of insights.  
This review of the literature points, therefore, to questions that need to be addressed to 
achieve the evidence-base for appropriate corporate decisions about when, how and why to 
conduct appraisals. It also questions about how well-suited regulation and public policy 
recommendations are to the issues they seek to address. This study makes an inroad in these 
questions by exploring the experiences and attitudes of directors of a range of listed companies 
working in jurisdictions broadly under the umbrella of UK institutions and practices: Britain 
itself and the Channel Islands, where the authorities have been keen to press for high standards. 
We discuss the sample and other methodological considerations next before presenting the 
findings of this inquiry.  
Methods 
To uncover attitudes to these issues, our research involved a two-stage process. First, we 
identified individuals capable of providing insight into the processes of board evaluation, 
drawn mainly from existing relationships of the lead researcher with people serving on boards 
of companies in the UK and the British Channel Islands. This is a common method in 
exploratory, practice-oriented research (Silverman, 2017). We started from a sampling frame 
of directors who at the time of the research were currently or had recently engaged in board 
evaluations at five companies, exercises that the lead researcher had observed. This sampling 
frame meant that all those contacted had first-hand experience. The directors were sent a 
questionnaire concerning the range of their directorships and their experience in board 
evaluation, as well as to determine their willingness to engage in the research. From this 
process, we identified 17 individuals for the interview phase of the research. Collectively, 
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these individuals held 50 directorships on listed company boards, either as chair, committee 
chair or non-executive director. In addition, they had served on boards of almost 200 more 
firms in a range of company-types, largely in fund management. Their board experience 
ranged from two years to 40 years.  
They divided into two groups: those with experience of external facilitation of boards and 
those who had undergone only self-evaluation exercises. Of the 17 individuals, all had 
participated in annual self-evaluation process in varying forms; eight had experienced external 
evaluation and among them had undertaken 20 such exercises, three while serving as directors 
of companies in the FTSE350.    
The second phase involved semi-structured interviews conducted by the lead researcher, 
ranging from 60 minutes to 90 minutes in length, using an initial instrument built upon the 
themes in the literature identified above. The interviews were recorded and transcribed for 
thematic analysis.  
During the interviews, the lead researcher sought their opinions about their experience of 
board evaluation exercises generally, rather than about the specific instance they were then 
undertaking. This encouraged the individuals to discuss a wide range of practices from across 
all the organisations on whose boards they had served. 
Because we take an exploratory approach, we followed the most salient issues for 
respondents, which were those arising from the policy context outlined above, as well as their 
experiences of the differences between self-evaluation and external facilitation in terms of 
process and outcomes, forming the three themes examined in the next section. Interviewees 
were encouraged to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the processes of each self-
evaluation and external evaluation. Where individuals had no direct experience of external 
evaluations, we nonetheless examined their attitudes towards the process, based on the view 
that as these contribute to an overall understanding of policy implementation. After iterative 
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reading of the transcripts, sections of the texts were categorised as positive and negative 
attitudes towards both evaluation processes. 
Coding involved descriptive terms drawn from the literature, including director attitudes 
towards a) the concept of and policy emphasis on board evaluation, b) the benefits and 
shortcomings of internally orchestrated and externally facilitated evaluations, and c) the 
outcomes of the processes. In a second iteration of analysis, we assessed another theme that 
emerged during the interviews: d) the frequency of evaluation. 
In the interviews, they provided insights to their experience at companies bound by this 
aspect of the UK Corporate Governance Code (that is, FTSE350 companies) as well as smaller 
companies that faced no such obligation but had engaged voluntarily in the practice. That 
suggests that these companies engaged in board evaluations as a matter of good practice, which 
we interpret as a sign of the growing significance of the practice.  
Findings 
Central to issue of evaluation are attitudes towards the process and policy. We look at 
attitudes towards self-assessment and external facilitation, views of the outcomes and then the 
frequency of external evaluations. 
Attitudes towards evaluation and policy 
In general, the interviewees recognised the importance of board evaluation. A quotation 
reflects the view of several participants:  
Director 14: Reassessment is imperative.… If there isn’t evaluation … then 
there's a risk you end up repeating mistakes or settling into bad habits and 
we know in business also that can result in the failure of the business 
especially at the board level. 
The value placed on the option to undertake an evaluation with an external consultant was 
explained as: 
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Director 6: The external board evaluator [is] there as an outside 
professional as you would use a lawyer or an accountant…. And it's good 
from time to time to have somebody say: “Well actually you could do a bit 
better if you did it that way.” Everybody can improve. 
Self-evaluation vs external facilitation 
For the self-evaluations they were then undertaking, each board used a questionnaire 
covering a range of topics: board composition, meeting process, board information, training, 
board dynamics, accountability, and effectiveness, as well as an evaluation of the leadership 
qualities of the chair. The questionnaires asked directors to rate topics on a scale of one-to-
three, with one signifying major improvement required and three no improvement necessary. 
For most questions, directors gave the highest score with no lowest scores given. Where 
directors thought some improvement was needed, they were asked to explain why.  
Some of the directors worried, however, that use of a questionnaire format lead to 
responses that were less than open and honest: 
Director 5: You don’t have to give sufficient justification for your 
reasoning in the scoring exercise, so you don’t expose yourself to actually 
showing deficiencies … We’ve done our job, we can’t be criticised too 
much, we’re ok, we’ve thought about it, now move on.  
Director 6: [You] can have situations when people aren’t particularly 
honest, and they want to duck the issue … [which can make self-
evaluation] a complete waste of time. 
Director 10: Board members are not necessarily going to say precisely 
what they think. 
This negative attitude towards honesty in the self-evaluation process was particularly 
associated with providing criticism of fellow directors: One of the directors explained it in 
these terms: 
Director 13: We tend to be defensive and we’ll tend to … look for people 
to reinforce our own belief of our competence than actually criticise.  
However, the directors said the key to good evaluations lay in open and honest responses and 
a serious approach to the process: 
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 Director 8: [Self-]evaluation has the capacity to be very helpful, but 
obviously it’s very reliant on how seriously people take it. 
Director 11: [We need] a board that will say what it thinks as opposed to 
what it thinks it ought to say. 
Where directors did not consider the self-evaluation process of benefit, it was mostly because 
they felt there were no issues with the board. One explained that: 
Director 10: It’s a pain in the neck … If you have a board that works well 
together it’s very easy to do, but it’s always an additional burden on the 
board. 
Where directors were engaged with the process, the predominant benefit was that of 
providing time to consider their contribution to the board, the use of their skills in the 
boardroom, to allow for board composition considerations with a balance of skills and 
knowledge and as a group the weaknesses and behaviour which needed improvement: 
Director 1: A board that conducts proper evaluation is more confident in its 
behaviour and in its discharging of its duties. 
Director 3: Without the process, you’ve got no way of formally identifying 
weaknesses. 
The need for open and honest evaluation was acknowledged as existing not only for the 
improvement of the performance of the board and company but also at a personal level for the 
directors. Poor performance not identified through evaluation could ultimately lead to 
company failure or regulatory issues for which the individual board director would be culpable 
under their fiduciary duty: 
Director 8: Very few people see it as constructive, but the people who’ve 
looked at it as constructive tend to be a certain type of person who really 
understands the risk they’re personally taking. 
The directors suggested that to increase the value of self-evaluation, questionnaire needed to 
focus on company-specific attributes and events, as well as general questions.  
The directors also suggested performance appraisal of the board from management and 
the company secretary, a variation on the 360-degree appraisals that became common in 
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human resources management since the 1990s (Atwater & Waldman, 1998), though not 
without controversy (Waldman, Atwater, & Antonioni, 1998). Each of the boards in our study 
discussed the results of their self-evaluation in a boardroom setting with no others present 
other than the company secretary.  
In all evaluation results, no criticism towards the performance of the board or chair was 
recorded, and in the open discussions no directors disclosed inter-relational dynamics, board 
culture, or environmental changes they deemed necessary. The reluctance to include any 
comments in the self-evaluations do not appear to be specific to the boardroom observations 
as part of the study, evidenced with:  
Director 9: These evaluations have not really resulted … in [a] change in 
behaviour, individually and collectively, but it should. 
Director 12: Bringing problems out into the open can be a double-edged 
sword. You can fix them sometimes, but you can also create animosity 
which doesn’t go away. 
Boardroom discussions focused on relationships external to the board itself, calling for 
information flow to be increased in relation to their oversight role, for example, to monitor the 
actions of the managers and to be kept up to date with regulatory changes. The chair or the 
company secretary agreed to implement the improvements required.  
Self-evaluation was mainly valued as a tool for improvement. Where the directors that 
tended to consider that their self-assessment was working well or for a few where they felt 
they were experienced board members, little requirement for an external evaluator was seen: 
Director 3: When you’ve got the vast experience…it would be total 
overkill to do it. 
They recognised that external evaluators can add value by obtaining in-depth opinions, more 
so than the self-evaluation: 
Director 5: [The external evaluator] might get down to the truth in more 
detail. 
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Director 9: If we have a good questionnaire, and we have honest 
participants and constructive answers, as far as the exercise of asking the 
questions and getting the answers, internal or external doesn’t make much 
difference … but where the external board evaluator can provide a more 
robust assessment would be where they might dig in a bit more. 
Yet some stated that they would not want to speak openly with the evaluator about issues they 
see as appropriate only to the board or chair. Some said such issues should not have to wait 
until the next scheduled evaluation: 
Director 12: There are issues that I would rather bring up directly with the 
board and not involve a third party. 
Director 6: I think it’d be far more likely if there … were really bad 
dynamics … individuals involved would speak to the chair … rather than 
waiting for board evaluation. 
In contrast, there may be issues that only can be discussed with an independent third party: 
Director 2: In the case of boards that may be dominated by one person … 
outside influence might be useful. 
Although a few directors had no experience of external evaluation, they generally felt that 
they would be more open and honest with an external evaluator than they would in a self-
evaluation questionnaire. 
To obtain the honesty that a good evaluation requires, respondents said the external 
evaluator needs a) to be independent from the company under review, b) to be in possession 
of the necessary skills and experience to deem the results reliable, and c) to be trustworthy and 
discreet:  
Director 8: If there is any hint that they are not discreet then people are not 
going to speak to them openly and therefore the process won’t be valuable. 
The evaluator also needs to d) know how to deliver feedback to the board with a degree of 
diplomacy, whilst also e) possess the necessary influence and impact for the board members 
to respect their evaluation results. One director said the only way boards would respect 
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outsiders’ suggestions for changes in processes was if the evaluator acquired a status like that 
of a regulator: 
Director 14: They [the board] are top of the tree; who’s going to have an 
impact and influence over the individuals on the board? In finance only the 
regulator can perform that. 
One of the largest concerns was that the evaluator would not understand the company or 
the board’s interpersonal dynamics; they might misinterpret one-off observation either in or 
outside the boardroom, or during interviews the evaluator conducted. One director explained 
the misinterpretation of social interaction as follows:  
Director 13: The reviewer came ... to the normal board dinner [and 
reported the board as] a bit too friendly [and queried] whether you could be 
confrontational with your fellow board members and also civil over a 
dinner table. 
The directors also worried that the methodology they experienced, in which the evaluator 
observed only one board meeting, would not provide a true picture of board dynamics. The 
modification of behaviour that took place whilst being observed was explained as: 
Director 4: They [the other directors] felt they had to say something 
because they were being marked. 
There may also be a possibility that the directors could be dominated and forced by the 
chair to perform for the evaluator, evidenced as: 
Director 14: Just before the [evaluator] was invited into the room, [the 
chair] says, Look, I’ll say a few things and I’m this sort of person, I expect 
this, I don’t expect this, and I just want to remind you … 
Where they have been involved in external evaluation, the directors experienced positive 
consequences. They felt results of the external evaluation informed the next annual self-
evaluation and improved the process. Also, the act of deciding to allow an external consultant 
to evaluate the board led to improvements in board processes ahead of beginning the 
evaluation: 
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Director 4: [We] look at ourselves with our own self-evaluation and 
decide, do we think we could stand up to someone coming in and looking 
at us from the outside. 
The substance of this quote points to the next issue of concern. If evaluations are not just 
window-dressing, that is, not just designed to comply with a reporting requirement, then what 
matters at least as much as process is the outcomes of evaluation, whichever process is used.  
Outcomes of board evaluations 
The directors generally saw benefits to external evaluation over self-evaluation. Those 
that had experienced the process felt the facilitator’s detachment made comparison to other 
companies possible, and thus advice on best practice: 
Director 15: Evaluation adds enormous value because they can benchmark 
the board against other boards. 
Director 4: Someone else coming in with fresh eyes, fresh thoughts, whose 
seen other companies operating … can see that’s pretty good but have you 
thought of … 
Some experienced validation of the boards existing processes and performance which 
provide for increased confidence on the board:  
Director 6: It’s not all criticism … It is an excellent exercise which can 
really show you that the board is being run properly, [and] that you are 
considering the right things. 
Both groups of directors – those who had and had not been through the external evaluation 
process – placed greater value on the results of external evaluation than self-evaluation. They 
were not only the advice from an expert, but because the advice had been sought and being 
paid for, the recommendations would be acted upon: 
Director 7: If you have an external report the board has to do something 
about it because it is a formal document … you would take it more 
seriously … as a more balanced view. 
Director 15: If you’re paying someone to provide a service then it focuses 
your mind on actually achieving something in return for that investment. 
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The directors wanted to receive in their reports from the external evaluator not only the 
results of the observation and the interviews but ideas on how to improve performance:  
Director 6: When it’s an external evaluation, there could be a list of tasks 
that we should do. 
Director 10: If they can identify things that are missing and map against 
the [corporate governance] code and come up with proper suggestions, I 
think that can be quite helpful. 
In contrast some felt the suggestions for improvement that had been received were not of 
significance, evidenced by this comment: 
Director 13: Didn’t give us any concrete points to change the board, there 
were a few comments we took on board, but it really didn’t help. 
The directors saw benefits from employing an external evaluator if the evaluator had the 
considerable experience and approached the process to generate suggestions for change, at 
both the board and an individual level: 
Director 15: Are there behaviours that you as an individual are introducing 
… is the company successful despite your behaviour rather than because of 
it? 
Frequency of reviews 
In relation to the use of an external facilitator for board evaluation, directors were willing 
to extend the code’s recommendation of external evaluators beyond the FTSE350: 
Director 17: [External evaluation is] a source of best practice that even 
smaller companies should aspire to, so on that basis I wouldn’t see any 
reason to remove something just because the company isn’t big enough for 
FTSE350. 
The three-year frequency in the code was largely considered to be correct, even for 
smaller companies, though with some reservations: 
Director 14: Reassessment is imperative … if there isn’t evaluation … then 
there’s a risk you end up repeating mistakes or settling into bad habits and 
we know in business also that can result in the failure of the business 
especially at the board level. 
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Director 14: If you’re just in a constant cycle of … assessment … you’ll 
never anything done. 
However, there was a concern over cost to meet the code when the board considered the 
necessity as not there: 
Director 11: The question I have is whether or not the cost is justified.  
There is a view that it should be done every three and I’ve spoken to 
investors and they get quite upset of the fact.  If they feel that the Board is 
doing a good job, why should they have to cough up anything from 
GBP10,000 to GBP15,000 every three years when they’re totally happy.   
 The flexibility of the code provides the ability, where there were issues identified, to 
alter the frequency of external evaluation could be reconsidered and evaluations conducted 
more as needs dictated, rather than according to a fixed schedule: 
Director 17: When specific issues have been identified and there is room 
for improvement there shouldn’t be any reason why there shouldn’t be a 
follow-up with a further evaluation the next year. 
But the frequency did need to be carefully considered and not just applied to meet the code 
with a suggestion that shareholders be invited to opine as to whether they would agree to the 
board being externally evaluated, which would allow for increased shareholder engagement 
and inversely shareholder accountability: 
Director 11: I wonder whether or not it would be appropriate if a circular to 
all investors was done prior to an external Board evaluation and the cost 
incurred?  
Discussion 
The literature suggests that directors were initially reluctant to recognise the importance 
of evaluation, even though it had been identified in policy post-Enron. Our inquiry, however, 
indicates that a decade after the onset of the financial crisis, and after even firmer policy 
direction, directors’ attitudes have transformed. They accept that evaluations have an 
important role in enhancing board performance, with the indirect but important benefit of 
contributing to and ensuring company continuity beyond the current directors’ tenure. Our 
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research also validates an observation in Rebeiz (2016) that the benefits of evaluation depend 
on the commitment to the process by their fellow directors.  
This acceptance could be attributable to two main factors: high profile corporate 
governance failures and longevity of implementation. In the 2008 failure of the UK banking 
group HBOS Plc, investigation by the regulator uncovered boardroom behavioural dynamics 
that demonstrated that boards’ actions and behaviour can directly affect company performance 
(Bank of England, 2015). It is worth noting that our research found little evidence that 
behavioural dynamics are discussed during a board’s self-evaluation process, but external 
evaluators were sensitive to them.   
The second factor contributing to the attitude shift may be due to the longevity and 
frequency of the application of the requirements for evaluation under the UK code. The UK 
acceptance of evaluation is in contrast to a similar study of Norwegian corporate governance 
abiding companies by Rasmussen (2015), which may be attributable to the evaluation 
requirements of the Norwegian corporate governance code not specifying the frequency or 
necessity of annual or external evaluations. It would be interesting to examine attitudes of 
different boards abiding to different corporate governance codes with differing evaluation 
guidance to ascertain whether this link between requirements and acceptance is general and 
valid. 
Our respondents’ attitudes towards evaluation carried out by an external consultant 
seemed to be shifting; they acknowledge the importance of their role, but acceptance is not 
universal. Directors in our study remained reluctant to accept that outsiders could understand 
the specific boardroom environment and identify and make valid suggestions for improved 
board performance. There was agreement that greater acceptance of the professionalism of the 
sector would be obtained with a code of practice (Pitcher, 2014). Such a draft exists; however, 
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there is no regulatory backing and accreditation of evaluation practitioners has not yet been 
achieved.  
The research uncovered difficulties in the process of self-evaluation as well. These were 
identified as lack of defined purpose ahead of commencing the evaluation; inability to identify 
dysfunctional behavioural dynamics; lack of independence to remain impartial; reluctance to 
voice concerns; and an inability to assess against peers. These deficits mean the results of self-
evaluation are not a true reflection of the board environment. Importantly, evaluation results 
were not acted upon and few suggestions for change were implemented. 
Difficulties identified during self-evaluation may be overcome by employing an 
evaluation practitioner who has skills and experience an internal reviewer may not possess 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2005). However, this study suggests that facilitators can contribute their 
own difficulties. Utilising an external evaluator brings a degree of independence and 
objectivity, but their work is still subjective and interpretivist, as in ethnographic research, and 
thus may face criticism from sceptical participants. 
This study shows that the self-evaluation processes we examined did not involve statement 
of the initial purpose and extent of the evaluation, a starting point deemed in the literature to 
be relevant for validity (Minichilli et al., 2007). This contrasts with the examples of external 
evaluation our respondents described. As with other engagements of professional consultants, 
mandates given to external evaluators defined the purpose and extent of the exercise. Doing 
so provided relevancy to the results.   
To overcome the difficulties in self-evaluation, the results suggest that external evaluators 
need to identify and classify behavioural dynamics, the decision-making culture (Bailey & 
Peck, 2013; Huse, 2005; Samra-Fredericks, 2000), group psychology processes (Merchant & 
Pick, 2010), and the emotional energies in the boardroom (Brundin & Nordqvist, 2008). These 
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are factors not generally included in self-evaluation; and, as Bollich, Rogers, and Vazire 
(2015) explain, they are difficult to detect by those directly involved.  
In our research, directors said they had received no individual feedback during self-
evaluations of boards; in the cases of employee appraisals and group activities, the human 
resources literature shows such individual reflection leads to improved performance (Church, 
1997; Duval & Lalwani, 1999; London, Larsen, & Thisted, 1999). Through interviews and 
boardroom observation, an external evaluator can build a picture of the current performance 
of a board and individual directors, and to provide feedback on issue that need to be addressed. 
The independence afforded to them ensures they are less inclined than in self-evaluation to 
perform errors of omission (Caputo & Dunning, 2005). 
Evaluation results can form objectives for the following year (Conger, Finegold, & 
Lawler, 1998; Rasmussen, 2015). Our research discovered such objective-setting not always 
an outcome of the self-evaluation process, but it did where an external evaluation process had 
been undertaken. The evaluator can also assist the chair to facilitate the changes considered as 
necessary for a better functioning board, as part of the developmental function of evaluation 
(Rasmussen, 2015).  
Our respondents suggested that neither internal nor external evaluation processes hold the 
board accountable for implementing the identified changes. Our findings also chime with 
research showing that board and group culture tends to come from the chair (McNulty, 
Pettigrew, Jobome, & Morris, 2011; Neubauer, 1997), and where change was needed, that 
directors would look to the chair for implementation (Leblanc, 2005; Reicher, Haslam, & 
Hopkins, 2005). This suggests that external facilitators can grow into somewhat larger roles, 
in acting as counsel to chairs, which can then enhance their understanding of the company and 
its special circumstances. With such increased involvement comes the risk they will gradually 
become insiders. If their role has the ability to effect change much in the way a  regulator can, 
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as Director 14 suggested, then increasing involvement in implementation might increase the 
risk of a new form of regulatory capture (cf. Baxter, 2011). 
Should boards be given greater flexibility over the timing of board evaluations, even more 
than the comply-or-exchange regime permits? Doing so might make them less tied to the 
reporting and less hostage to the tick-box mentality (FRC, 2012) that has become attached to 
the UK Corporate Governance Code in general, and to similar regimes in other countries. This 
study suggests, however, that directors welcome the prescribed frequency of once every three 
years because it reduces subjectivity and helps them overcome the priorities of their chair, 
especially when a domineering character holds the role. This level of comfort of prescribed 
external evaluation extends to shareholders insofar as an account of the evaluation is published 
in the accounts, allowing the shareholders to look beyond the company results and into the 
workings of the board. Although not part of this study, current reporting on evaluation is 
generally considered very basic and further research into evaluation disclosure to shareholders 
and stakeholders could be undertaken. 
Limitations and implications for research 
This is a small study of boards of mainly smaller companies, which makes it difficult to 
generalise the findings across the wide range of companies now engaging in board evaluation. 
However, the nascent literature on this field needs studies like this to frame the issues, 
understand the attitudes of directors, and see how those attitudes develop as they become 
increasingly familiar with the task. These observations suggest a variety of avenues for future 
exploratory and confirmatory research to help us stay abreast of the evolving practice and to 
inform further public policy initiatives.  
Because research into board evaluation is at an early stage, we still need to identify the 
right questions before we can develop theories to explain how the process works and how it 
differs, for example, from employee performance management or the psychology of 
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workgroups and project teams. Our study has detected some of the practices, but its scale is 
too small to suggest we have any more than scratched the surface of the full variety of ways 
in which boards conduct such activities.  
We have seen evidence of questionnaire-based information gathering, of interviews and 
board observations that feed into the evaluation. We have seen evidence of group meetings to 
discuss the outcomes, and we heard of findings left undiscussed and unacted upon. Practice-
level research, examining the artefacts and rituals of board evaluation, would give us better 
insights into how the process embeds itself, and what leads the process towards successful 
discovery or down the path to stale routine.  
The literature suggests board evaluation is seen as a powerful but neglected tool in the 
quest for improved board and firm performance. The literature we reviewed provides much 
advice about conducting board evaluations, but little evidence. And just as the links between 
effectiveness and performance are complex, as Forbes and Milliken (1999) and those that 
followed it have described, the links between evaluation and effectiveness need exploration as 
well, so we can understand what factors matter.  
The study gives us some pointers, however. Many of the antecedents, process elements, 
and outcomes are coming to be understood, and enhanced disclosure is making data available 
to help assess, for example, the effort norms of boards and the balance of knowledge and skills 
on the boards. But the evaluation process, and the board evaluators themselves, gives insights 
into the interpersonal relations of directors, and to the characteristics of directors themselves, 
their traits and biases. For example, do directors exhibit the persuasiveness that Leblanc and 
Gillies (2005) associate with directors of successful boards, or the cultural intelligence (Earley, 
2002) and sensitivity to other directors it seems to imply (Charas, 2015)? Understanding these 
factors might help boards and directors cope with the tensions between cognitive conflict and 
board cohesiveness that Forbes and Milliken (1999) highlight. It is difficult to gain access to 
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study such matters in corporate boards, to be sure. Yet as a proxy for corporate boards, research 
might be conducted, confidentially and with great discretion, perhaps in public-sector boards, 
where a greater inclination towards openness to external scrutiny is likely.  
Implications for practice and policy 
Our study also has implications for the practice of boards and evaluators, and for policy 
and regulation. We spoke with directors of mainly small companies, smaller than those at 
whom the policy of external evaluation is directed. They generally found something valuable 
in the process, particularly when an external evaluator was present and when that person was 
sufficiently grounded in the company’s business to understand the nuances. This suggests 
something about the character and skills needed by board evaluators. Given the direction of 
travel in policy, the number of board evaluators seems set to rise.  
The knowledge and skills of evaluators that seem so valued now may already be rather 
scarce, suggesting a need to develop new greater capabilities of evaluators as well as more 
capacity for board evaluation. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many large company boards 
have resisted the entreaties of large management consultancies, accountancy firms, and 
headhunters to fill the gap, preferring instead the help of boutique board evaluation firms. The 
practices they follow are less than fully understood, so understanding their approach to 
evaluation as well as boards may be important. Some of the suggestions in this study point to 
a role for a professional body to certify evaluators and thus provide the trust identified directors 
require. This acceptance by boards of the experience and qualification of evaluators would 
then lead to acceptance of the evaluation results and implementation of improvement 
suggestions. In the meantime, even our modest study suggests a need for the 
professionalisation of practice, and with it some certification, if not perhaps standardisation.  
There is a danger – evident in the literature as well as in the undercurrent of our directors’ 
thinking – that the routinisation of board evaluation may induce what Westphal and Zajac 
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(1998) call the symbolic management in corporate relations with the shareholders, that is, the 
manipulation of compliance tasks and disclosure to misrepresent activities undertaken. 
Corporate governance ratings firms already target board evaluation reporting as an element in 
their compliance rankings. Such metrics have worked their way into the portfolio management 
exercises of asset management firms and into the interrogation of directors by investment 
analysts and those engaged in monitoring environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues.  
The impact for public accountability for private conversations looms large in this field, 
and we understand, as yet, so little about it. The chances for unintended consequences from 
policy decisions need careful thought. Would further disclosure on the inner workings of the 
board lead to smaller, currently out-of-scope firms choosing not to implement what is starting 
to be seen as best practice? And if so, would they be missing out on the opportunity to obtain 
professional advice as to become more effective decision-making groups? 
Conclusions 
Board evaluation is clearly gaining traction in the UK, as well as farther afield, as a policy 
direction is transformed into practice. It may not prove to be the elusive cure to the recurrent 
crises in corporate governance. After all, the spectacular and sudden insolvency of Carillion 
early in 2018 came just as the UK was adopting a new corporate governance code, with 
stronger provisions for board evaluation.  
By exploring the attitudes of directors who have undertaken multiple board evaluations, 
this study makes two contributions to the nascent understanding of the practice of this 
important policy direction. First, our study shows acceptance that external evaluation of boards 
can add value. That acceptance is somewhat grudging, however, and is in evidence only when 
facilitators focus on the interpersonal dynamics often overlooked in questionnaire-based 
approaches to self-evaluations. This validates the policy direction in codes and listing rules to 
mandate at least occasional use of external facilitators in larger firms.  
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Second, acknowledgement by directors of companies not directly facing the institutional 
constraints and policy pressure, demonstrates that the practice is accelerating into arenas not 
envisaged in policy. It is worth noting that codes of practice for boards of UK unlisted 
companies, charities and even governmental bodies now recommendation board evaluation, 
including the use of external consultants. This suggests a need for professionalisation of 
service providers, and for research to better understand the overlaps, complementarities, and 
limitations of board self-evaluation and exercises facilitated by outsiders. 
Further research is needed, therefore, to understand what parts of the process are largely 
independent of such industry- and firm-level knowledge to add value. Doing so would help 
practitioners develop the skills needed to meet the growing demand for external facilitation 
that seems inevitable from the policy direction. This study points us towards developing 
greater understanding of the interplay between the social characteristics of directors, the 
dynamics of the boardroom that result from them, and how those dynamics contribute to board 
effectiveness, that is, to open the black box a crack. Given the difficulties of conducting board 
research, the developing practice of board evaluation may shed light on that darkness.  
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Table 1 - Advantages, drawbacks of board evaluation (empirical studies in italics) 
 Element Benefits 











Formal CEO evaluation benefits director 
resource provision (Del Brio, Yoshikawa, 
Connelly, & Tan, 2013); board evaluation 
benefits strategy work (Machold et al., 
2011; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006); in small 
firms monitoring as well (Nordqvist & 
Minichilli, 2009); “exemplar” evaluations 
show benefit in profits (Roy, 2015) 
 
Addresses “elephant in the room” (Board & 
Adminstrator, 2013); assesses knowledge, 
skills of directors (Curtis, 2007); 
performance (Garratt, 1999); understanding 
individuals, group dynamics (Gordon, 
2015); opens dialogue on strategy 
(Likierman, 2009); board evaluation as 
mechanism to examine “constructive” 
conflict, “interpersonal cohesion” 
(Sonnenfeld, 2002); benefits for board 
effectiveness (Stybel & Peabody, 2005) 
Formal CEO evaluation 
process not significant 
for director monitoring 
(Del Brio et al., 2013) 
 
Board evaluation may 
be used to mechanism to 
squeeze out directors 
(Clarke & Klettner, 
2010; Dulewicz & 
Herbert, 2008; 
Nicholson et al., 2012) 
Legitimacy 
Signals commitment to shareholder value 
(Curtis, 2007); conformance (Garratt, 
1999); benefits for external perceptions of 
board, favourable D&O insurance (Stybel 
& Peabody, 2005) 
Risk of creating paper 





Danger that search for 
legitimacy may reduce 
evaluation to 
administrative exercise, 
not opportunity for 
board improvement 
(Fenwick & Vermeulen, 









Trustees (of non-profits) view benefits as 
board-internal, see little benefit for 
outsiders (Lichtsteiner & Lutz, 2012); 
evaluation viewed as having intrinsic value 
to directors, rather than value creation for 
firm (Rasmussen, 2015; Sponbergs, 2007) 
 
In family firms, formal board evaluation 
overcomes “fault-lines” becoming crises 
(Vandebeek et al., 2016) 
 
External 
Consider non-traditional stakeholders, i.e., 
D&O insurers; also potential acquirers 
(Stybel & Peabody, 2005); think of 
regulators as audience (Leblanc, 2005) 
 













Self-assessment brings benefits to board 
strategy work (Machold et al., 2011; 
Schmidt & Brauer, 2006) 
 
Chair-led evaluations commonplace 
(Brunzell, 2012); need for, issues in 
evaluation of chair (Neubauer, 1997); by 




distinctions between the 







Creates objectivity, open avenue to discuss 
interpersonal issues (Long, 2006);  
Resistance to outsiders 
in boardroom (Copnell, 





















Formal tools ensure rigour, enhance 
accountability (Aly & Mansour, 2017); 
questionnaires can capture good view of 
inputs to board processes (Heracleous & 
Lan, 2002); contingencies can be addressed 
through examination of business 
environment (Conti, 2003; Van der Walt & 
Ingley, 2000) 
Director concern over 
“mindless checklists”, 
“over-engineering” of 
process; concern over 
political aspects in 
“horizontal” (peer) 
evaluation as opposed 
to “vertical” appraisal 
of employees (Ingley & 




(Clarke & Klettner, 
2010); paralysis by 
analysis (Gordon, 
2015); form over 
substance (Kazanjian, 
2000); risks unhelpful 
categorisation of 




Structure, content of evaluation can be 
sensitive to contingencies in board 
structure, firm lifecycle, culture (Long, 











Focus of evaluation on activities and 
resources of the board, emphasising 
strategic role (Conger et al., 1998); inputs, 
including information; processes, including 
information management (Epstein & Roy, 
2005) 
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Interpersonal 
Board evaluation aimed principally as tool 
for board improvement might focus on 
cultural intelligence, group dynamics and 
director sensitivity as well as process 
(Nordberg & Booth, 2019b). 
 
Interpersonal development viewed as prime 

















Evaluation can get to three levels: board, 
committees, directors (Daily & Dalton, 
2003) 
Lack of engagement 
threatens success of 
evaluation (Daily & 
Dalton, 2003) 
Selective 
CEO evaluation different: consider 360-
degree including external stakeholders 
(Epstein & Roy, 2005) 
 
Audit committee evaluation results reveals 
lack of attention to skills development 
(Martinov-Bennie et al., 2015) 
 
Decision whether to evaluate CEO 
contingent on organisation circumstances 
(Young, Stedham, & Beekun, 2000) 
 
Evaluation of chairs important, as 
leadership is crucial to board effectiveness 
(Neubauer, 1997) 
Resistance to evaluation 
of individual directors 
(Clarke & Klettner, 
2010) 
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